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THE BEGINNINGS OF PRIESTLEY'S MATERIALISM 
Alan Tapper 
The mature materialism of Joseph Priestley's Disquisitions relating to 
Matter and Spirit of 1777 is based on three main arguments: that Newton's 
widely-accepted scientific methodology requires the rejection of the 
'hypothesis' of the soul; that a dynamic theory of matter breaks down the 
active/passive dichotomy assumed by many dualists; and that interaction 
between matter and spirit is impossible. In Matter and Spirit it is the first two 
arguments which are given greatest prominence; but it is the third argument 
which first brought Priestley to take materialism seriously. It was an argument 
which had persistently troubled him in his dualist years, but it was not until 
1774 in the Examination that (as he tells us) he 'first entertained a serious 
doubt of the truth of the vulgar hypothesis' (III, 202).' Underlying this fact is 
an episode of some complexity. The Examination was Priestley's reply to the 
three Scottish Common Sense philosophers, Thomas Reid, James Beattie 
and James Oswald, with appendices on Richard Price and James Harris. 
Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind of 1764 was Priestley's main concern, 
and the subject of the debate was not the nature of mind but scepticism, 
realism and the 'Theory of Ideas'. 
The 'sceptics' under discussion were Berkeley and Hume. Both Reid and 
Priestley thought Berkeley and Hume had denied the reality of the external 
world, and both wished to reinstate external reality. Priestley thought the 
sceptical challenge could be met without any great difficulty. It was, he held, 
based on a misunderstanding of the canons of scientific reasoning: the 
assumption that whatever can not be demonstrated is not worthy of rational 
belief. 
It is quite sufficient if the supposition (of an external world] be the 
easiest hypothesis for explaining the origin of our ideas. The evidence of 
it is such that we allow it to be barely possible to doubt of it; but that it is 
as certain as that two and two make four, we do not pretend (III, 46-7) . 
1 All references in the text are to The Theological and Miscellaneous Works of Joseph Priestley, 25 
volumes in 26, edited by John Towill Rutt (London, 1817-32; reprinted New York, 1972). The 
full title of the Examination is An Examination of Dr Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind on the 
Principles of Common Sense; Dr Beattie's Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth; and Dr 
Oswald's Appeal to Common Sense in Behalf of Religion. 
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Priestley's realism was 'representative' realism He took th L k 
of Id~as-the theory that all our percepti~ns are m:di~~de~n Theory 
sensations-to be one of the best establish d h" o us by 
philosophy, and he could see nothing in Be~ke~~y teve~ents of modem 
undermining that achievement. or ume capable of 
Reid, by contrast, thought that Berkele d H 
upheaval in philosophy and that orde ~an . ume had brought about an 
abolishing the whole tradition of 'id r a~ samty ~~uld on!y be restored by 
Democritus and Aristotle. The det: eas -a. tradttt~n whtch goes back to 
required a new conception of the pence of re~ltsm ag~mst Humean scepticism 
The capacity to perceive reality hadot~e;s an ~p~ratiOns of the hu?Ian mind. 
of the mind and this . e coun e as one of the native powers representativ~ ideas. The~;~ tso~ot to _be_ explicated by reference to 
principal source of Humean scepf;c. Id~a~ tsl m fact , to be regarded as the 
the Theory entire! innoce . .ts~. nest ey, on the other hand, thought 
his theory of causa~ion and ~~u~~tts vte":, Hume's s~epticism stemmed from 
of causal relations is onl one reaso!lmg. For Retd, Hume's 'destruction ' 
produced by the Theory ~f Ide~:.sualty m the general 'destruction of worlds' 
Reid appealed to common sense to su h" b . . . 
perceive reality directly. In Priestle 's pport h ~s ehef 1~ t?e mmd's ability to 
fraught with sceptical implication y IteJ.es, t ts appealts t~self a manoeuvre 
reasoning to furnish us with a reali:t 1~sp~ted the suffictency of scientific 
regard as knowledge a lot of mere .~o; -~tew, and thereby compelled us to 
the arbitrary constitution of our nat~~· tO~~tv;l)e~ua~;ons , ~epe?din_g upon 
to be possible, some pro osition ' . e a ows t at , ~~ sctence is 
foundational but he confi p ~ must be ta~en as self-evtdent and 
and predicat~ must be 'dl_l!s self-evtdence to analytical propositions-subject 
1 Iuerent names for the same thi ' (III 17) ~a~~~~ar~~;o&~si~~ns of ?Jathematics ('twice two is fou~~ fall ~ithi~ ~~ 
. ' er sctences-metaphysics morals th I 
sctence and politics-can produce no bi ' ' eo ogy' natural whic~ can be accepted as self-evid~~~f~a e d~Iementa'!' propositions' 
relatively circumscribed a eal to c . ccor mg _to ~nestley , Reid's 
successors, Beattie and os:Id ommo? ~en~e . m_evttably leads his 
primary truths of religion' and th to ~~large tts Jun~d~ctt?n to include 'the 
truth (' that to us is truth which wee/:;; t~n~es of Chnstt_amtr (Oswald) or all 
Beattie [III, 72]) . a we must belteve , he quotes from 
2 _G~org~ <;ampbell was quick to observe that Pri 1 · 
distmgmshmg acceptable self-evidence nor had h es~ ey had failed to supply any criterion for 
Cf The Philosophy of Rhetoric (Londo~ , 1850), 3;. given any non-mathematical examples of it. 
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Only a part of Reid's Inquiry consists of assertions based on self-evidence 
or common sense. That there is no external world is self-evidently false , Reid 
argues; but that 'ideas' do not exist is not self-evident. Reid's argument 
against the existence of ideas depends in part on his claim that belief in ideas 
leads to an 'absurd' denial of external existence: put this way, the argument is 
designed to give pause to any followers of Hume and Berkeley who value 
common sense. But against the followers of Locke, his argument has to 
consist of a demonstration that belief in ideas does entail a denial of matter, 
and this side of Reid is more difficult to reconstruct. Reid believes that this 
demonstration has already been performed by Berkeley and Hume, and he 
takes the demonstration, together with the argument from common sense, as 
constituting a reductio ad absurdum of the Theory of Ideas. Priestley's 
purpose is to show that Reid's 'demonstration' is a failure . The Theory of 
Ideas is , in his opinion, entirely innocent of the sceptical progeny Reid 
accused it of fathering. Reid's appeal to common sense is not only dangerous; 
it is also unnecessary. 
The Reid-Priestley debate about ideas has a number of aspects, but it 
revolves around a central proposition: that sensations and ideas (if ideas exist) 
do not resemble the qualities of external objects. Reid thinks this is a truth 
discovered by Berkeley and Hume, which served as the 'innocent mother' 
when the Theory of Ideas begat the sceptical denial of external reality. 
Throughout the Inquiry Reid also assumed that ideas must resemble objects if 
they are to represent them; for him, then, ideas must be images of external 
things. 3 The main point in Priestley's Examination is his denial that ideas must 
resemble what they represent. In arguing thus, he openly concedes that they 
do not resemble their objects. Reid, he says, has 
suffered himself to be misled .. . merely by philosophers happening to 
call ideas the images of external things; as if this was not known to be a 
figurative expression denoting not that the actual shapes of things were 
delineated on the brain, or upon the mind, but only that impressions of 
some kind or other were conveyed to the mind by means of the organs of 
sense and their corresponding nerves, and that between these 
impressions and the sensations existing in the mind there is a real and 
necessary, though at present an unknown connexion (Ill , 36). 
Priestley is defending the Lockean claim that 'ideas' mediate perceptions. 
Lockean mediation is usually thought of as twofold: ' ideas' both represent 
their objects and they stand as part of a causal explanation of perception. 
Perception is to be thought of as the outcome of the causal sequence object-
' On this aspect of Reid see Selwyn Grave, "The 'Theory of Ideas"' in Thomas Reid: Critical 
Interpretations, eds. Stephen F. Barker and Tom L. Beauchamp (Philadelphia, 1976), 55-61. 
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(physiological) impression-sensation or idea. In defending ideas, Priestley 
defends this causal theory, and he seems to assume that by so doing the 
representation issue is also satisfied. He does, indeed, talk about two aspects 
of mediation in the first two (of six) 'fallacies' which he sees as 'the principal 
source of [Reid's] mistakes' , but these aspects are both presented in causal 
rather than representational terms. 
(1) Because he cannot perceive any resemblance between objects and 
ideas, he concludes that the one cannot produce the other. 
(2) Because he cannot perceive any necessary connexions between 
sensations and the objects of them, and therefore cannot abso-
lutely demonstrate the reality of external objects, or even of the 
mind itself, by the doctrine of ideas, he rejects that doctrine 
altogether, and has recourse to arbitrary instincts (III, 34). 
The first point here shows that Priestley thought Reid's denial of likeness 
between objects and ideas was aimed at refuting the causal rather than the 
representational aspect of mediation . 
The second point highlights a different dimension of the debate about 
ideas. The Inquiry contains a subsidiary attack on the Theory of Ideas which 
turns not on the issue of resemblance between objects and ideas but on 
conditions governing causal relations between body and mind. Reid's 
' resemblance' argument can be phrased as running: 'no representation 
without resemblance' . His subsidiary argument claims that we can only speak 
of causal relations between two entities when we can discern the mechanism 
of 'necessary connexion' between cause and effect. Priestley quotes Reid: 
'We are inspired by the sensation, and we are inspired by the corresponding 
perception, by means unknown. ' 4 For Reid, we cannot know that objects 
cause ideas because we do not know of any means by which they do so. 
Priestley thought this argument fallacious. Priestley and Reid disagree about 
perception partly because they dispute whether ideas must be images, but also 
because they dispute whether it is necessary to know the mechanism by which 
a putative cause produces its effect. 
4 The Works of Thomas Reid, ed. W. Hamilton , 7th ed., 2 Vols (Edinburgh, 1872). I , 188. Reid is 
certai!llY occasionalist with regard to physical transactions. In nature, he says, 'we neither 
perceive the agent nor the power, but the change only .. . ' Real efficiency belongs only to the 
'm~taphysical cause', 'the agent behind the scene', which for him must be supernatural agency. 
lbtd. , II , 523. His denial of physical action on mind is similarly inspired. Reid , however, felt no 
doubts about the reality of mind's action on matter. 
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However, while it is easy to distinguish between these two argume.nt~ in ~he 
Inquiry Priestley's way of handling the arguments blurs the distmction 
betwee~ them, even as he talks about Reid's 'two fallacies ' . He reads. 'no 
representation without rese~blance' as t~ntamount to 'no causal r~lat10ns 
without resemblance' . In th1s way the first argument becomes , hke the 
second, a causal argument. And, for Reid, the second argument rests on the 
assumption that mind and body are so di~similar that ther~ could be no 
intervening mechanism by means of which they c~uld mteract. Both 
arguments then involve the question of resemblance. Pnestley contends that 
both lack 'of r~semblance between cause and effect, and ignorance of 
mechanisms , is no barrier to knowledge of causation. 
The disagreement between Reid and Priestley about mec?anist?s .affects 
not only their attitude to the causal t.heory of perce~t10n: It. 1s also 
fundamental to their positions for and agamst free-will . (Pnestle~ wlll .argue 
that 'correspondences' show motives to be causally bound t? actiOns, JUSt as 
objects are bound to ideas.) In t?e abs~nce (as h~ thmks) .of a well-
authenticated mechanism of perception, Reid feels entitled to cla1m ~hat t?e 
'images' allegedly transmitted by the nerves are mer~ fi~tion~ , of n? e~Idential 
value. Hartley's theory of nervous 'vibrations' IS hke~Ise. dismissed as 
conjectural. He adds that these 'theories' are equally la~kmg I~ explana~ory 
force: 'If any man will s?ow ho~ the mind ~ay perceive ~ages m t.he g~a5m, I 
will undertake to explam how tt may percetve t~e ~ost distant obJe.cts . On 
Priestley's account of causal reasoning, these obJe~tions carry no w~tght. The 
'correspondences' between objects and sens~t10ns provtde ev~dence of 
causation which cannot be overruled by gaps m our understandmg of the 
perceptual process. 
I know . . . that the eye is the instrument of vision, because without it 
nothing can be seen .. . I am equally certain that t~e b~ain i~ necessa~ to 
all perception because if that be disordered, thmkmg e1ther entirely 
ceases, or is proportionably disturbed (III , 38). 
The philosopher is entitled to f~shi?n h~pothes:s .about the causa~ 
mechanism and these cannot be dtsmissed 1f they smt the phenomena 
(ibid.). It i~ interesting to note in passing that Reid's :hetoric against ideas-
'unphilosophical', 'no foundation i~ fact or obse~atton', etc.-corr.e~ponds 
closely to Priestley's language agamst the soul m M~tter and Spt~tt . The 
difference between them is that for Priestley, unlike Re1d , not all conJectures 
are unphilosophical. Priestley is committed to t?e view.that ide~s are , b.ut the 
soul is not, a philosophical conjecture. A ph1losophtcal conJecture ~s o~e 
which conforms to the first two of Newton's 'Rules of Reasomng m 
' Ibid . , I, 157 ; quoted by Priestley at III , 38. 
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Philosophy' , namely, 'We are to admit no more causes of natural things than 
such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances', and, 'to the 
same natural effects we must , as far as possible, assign the same causes' 
(Motte 's translation). 
Pri~stle~'s view of ca~sal reasoning rules out, for him, the possibility of 
o~caswnah.sm or parallelism: we know that mind and body do interact. Reid 's 
different v1ew makes the denial of interaction a possibility. Priestley's two 
mai~ J?Oints against Reid-Reid's first two 'fallacies'-are seen by him as 
nulhfymg the force of the Inquiry, but his examination also mounts a counter-
o~en~ive ~hie~ seeks t? drive Reid into the occasionalist camp, or, further 
still, I!lt? 1deahsm. It .Is from this counter-offensive that Priestley's early 
matenahsm largely denves. In a section entitled 'Mr Locke's Doctrine not so 
favourable to ~erkeley's Th~ory as Dr Reid's ', he assembles various passages 
fro!D, the In:quuy where Re1d approaches occasionalism. In these passages 
Re1d s d.ualism IS so .absolute as to make interaction doubtful. Mind and body 
are so different , Re1d says, that 'we can find no handle by which one may lay 
hold of the other' {III, 48). 6 And , following Berkeley, he asserts that 
'sensations and ideas in our minds can resemble nothing but sensations and 
ideas i~ other minds' (i~id.). 7 Dissimilarity has here become not a contingent 
fact , d1s~overed by careful attention to the phenomenology of sensations, but 
a necessity! consequent ':lpon the nature of the mind and matter. Priestley 
quotes a third passage which goes to the source of Reid's dualism: 'I take it for 
granted, upon the testimony of common sense, that my mind is a substance 
. . . and my reason convinces me that it is an unextended and indivisible 
substance; and hence I infer that there cannot be in it anything that resembles 
extension' {III, 47). 8 Reid's dualism, it seems, is based on the traditional 
c?n~ra~t betw~e!l ~atter's complexity and mind's 'simplicity'. Substances so 
diSSimilar, he IS mchned to suggest, are unable to interact· and if Reid himself 
hesitates to draw this conclusion, Priestley will draw it fo; him . 
Priestl~y. goe~ on ~o argue. that this 'occasionalism' leads readily to 
Berkeley s 1deal!s":I. H1s reasomng here rests on the principle which underlies 
the lat~r f!!atenahsm of Matter and Spirit , the principle of simplicity as 
embodied m Rule I of Ne~ton's 'Rules of Reasoning'. If all our perceptions 
an~ th.oughts w~uld remam exactly as they are if matter did not exist, then 
behef m a matenal world is otiose. If occasionalism is true , then the external 
world, 
6 Ibid. , 187. 
7 Ibid., 132. 
8 Ibid. , 210. 
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can be of no proper use to give us sensations and ideas. It must be (God] 
himself who impresses our minds with the notices of external things, 
without any real instrumentality of their own; so that the external world 
is really a superfluity in the creation (III , 47). 
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Deny interaction and it follows that 'this external world, which has been the 
subject of so much controversy, can have no existence' , for a wise God would 
create nothing superfluous. 
Priestley's 'counter-offensive' rests not just on the principle of simplicity, 
but also on the proposition that interaction between dissimilars is impossible. 
By now it may be beginning to appear that this proposition conflicts with his 
whole defence of the Theory of Ideas, but this apparent conflict can be 
examined in a moment. The proposition also forms the basis of Priestley's 
early materialism, and we can now see how this materialism followed from his 
encounter with Reid. Priestley was willing to regard Berkeley's idealism as a 
serious option-he could not dismiss it as contrary to common sense. He tells 
us that 'when I first entered upon metaphysical inquiries, I thought that either 
the material or immaterial part of the universal system was superfluous' (III, 
201), and Reid's Inquiry seems to have returned him to the same point. 
Despite the problem of interaction, Priestley could not deny that interactions 
between mind and matter did occur. It is, for him, more certain t):lat there are 
causal relations between matter and mind than that the mind is or is not 
material (III, 154), whereas for Reid the mind's immateriality is the 
fundamental certainty. The Theory of Ideas itself requires that there is a 
material world producing ideas in the mind. The causal theory of perception , 
and the theory of causal reasoning underlying it, are Priestley's primary 
concerns; to protect them involves rejecting idealism. But beyond this, he 
thinks that the principle of simplicity can also be enlisted against idealism. 
The chief defect of Berkeley's scheme is that it supposes a multitude of divine 
interpositions which , while not impossible, is not 'consonant to the course of 
nature in other respects' {III, 23) . The view that ideas are caused by their 
objects 'is recommended by the same simplicity that recommends every other 
philosophical theory, and needs no other evidence whatever'. It 'exhibits 
particular appearances as arising from general laws, which is agreeable to 
everything else we observe (ibid.). Realism is, then, a superior scientific 
theory. 
Far from the Theory of Ideas leading to Berkeley's 'scepticism' (as Reid 
thought), the Theory on Priestley's view, entails the falsity of idealism, and, 
further , Reid's denial of the Theory leads to idealism. But having thus tried to 
turn the tables on Reid, Priestley's own opinions also underwent a reversal. 
The problem of interaction between dissimilars was so great that if it was not 
alleviated, idealism would retain a measure of appeal. Interaction seemed 
impossible, and idealism seemed incompatible with the realism assumed by 
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the Theory of Ideas. Priestley, then , had no alternative but to declare himself 
a materialist . No problem is presented by interaction between brain and 
body. 
Two other difficulties did immediately present themselves: if the mind is 
the brain, are ideas also material? And, are there any a priori objections to 
identifying the mind with the brain? On the first point, Priestley took Hartley 
as his authority; on the second , Locke. He suggests that ideas no more 
resemble their objects than the stroke of a plectrum resembles the sound it 
produces. If Reid wishes to deny that objects cause ideas, then he must also 
deny that the stroke produces the sound. 
The transferring of this comparison to the doctrine of ideas is very easy. 
If, as Dr Hartley supposes, the nerves and brain be a vibrating 
substance, the analogy will hold very nearly; all sensations and ideas 
being vibrations in that substance, and all that is properly unknown in 
the business being the simple power in the mind to perceive, or be 
affected by, those vibrations. And if, as Locke and others suppose, 
matter itself may be indued with that sentient power, even that 
difficulty, as far as the present problem is concerned , is removed (III, 
36-7). 
The points were to present more difficulty than Priestley realized: he was to 
equivocate later about whether ideas are merely brain-processes; and he was 
to be troubled by the question of how matter might think. 
It remains to return to the apparent contradiction running through the 
Examination , both sides of which contribute to the formation of Priestley's 
materialism. In the defence of ideas he comments that 'it is impossible to say 
how [the nerves and brain] act upon the mind, or the mind upon them'-but, 
he adds, this is no ground for denying that they do interact. To reason thus 
would end in utter scepticism; by such sceptical reasoning 'we may deny every 
principle in nature' (III , 36). The implication is that science frequently makes 
progress despite an ignorance of mechanisms. And yet, when we come to the 
counter-attack on Reid, he asks , to reinforce the problem of interaction, 'how 
can any thing act upon another but by means of some common property? ' 
(III , 47). The implication here is that the absence of a mechanism makes 
causal relations between matter and spirit impossible . 
Priestley says no more than this , and his commentators have not pursued 
the matter. However, the 'contradiction' is only apparent. Priestley can be 
paraphrased as follows: Where we know a priori that there can be no 
me~hanisms (as in the case of matter and spirit) , there causation can be safely 
demed . Where we are simply ignorant of any mechanism, there knowledge of 
causation is a possibility. The difficulty in Priestley's case lies not at the level 
of these principles of causal reasoning, but at the point where he claims, while 
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still trying to be neutral about the nature of mind, that 'correspondences' 
show that objects do cause ideas. 
Clearly, if objects are , and ideas are not material , then (for him) objects 
cannot cause ideas. He is not entitled to adopt even a temporary stance of 
neutrality towards the ontological question. He wants to claim we ca~ know 
that objects cause ideas without knowing. ho~ they do s~ , b~t hts own 
principles require him to show that a mechamsm ts at lea~t poss~ble m the cas~ , 
and only materialism (or idealism) can guarantee tht~ . . It IS ':lot only hts 
counter-attack on Reid that requires him to adopt matenabsm; hts defence C?f 
the Theory of Ideas also requires it. The fact that he seems .unawar~ .of thts 
suggests no more than that the Examination records hts transition to 
materialism. 
One other difficulty remains. It is a basic point i~ P~estley 's defence C?f 
ideas that contra Reid ideas need not resemble thetr obJects. However, hts newly-ad~pted materiaiism holds that objec~s ~n~ id~as .are not .ontologic.ally 
dissimilar . One is left to conclude that the dtsstmtlanty ts of a dtfferent kmd, 
presumably qualitative or configura.tional ?i~similarity. It i~ true
9 
that Reid 
argues (in what we have termed hts. substdtary attack on tdeas ) ~om an 
ontological dissimilarity between obJ~Cts a~d tdeas to the conclusiOn that 
ideas cannot resemble or represent obJects many way , ?ut we ~a? ~res~me 
that for Priestley ontological dissimilarity is not the only kmd of dtsstmtlanty. 
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